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Abstract
As distributed generation (DG) continues to expand, larger low-voltage
networks will be required in the future. However, regulated distribution
network operators (DNOs) need to invest in new infrastructure without
knowing a relevant determinant of network costs, the future amount of
DG. Due to uncertainty, optimal network capacity needs to re￿ ect the
expected demand for capacity over all possible DG states. Therefore, not
all capacity will be used if a low level of DG occurs. Optimal regula-
tion that is set under asymmetric information about future DG needs to
create incentives for the DNO to invest in this ￿ excess capacity￿and also
encourage optimal network utilization. In this case, an option menu that
includes ￿xed fees and positive network charges on DG-producers ful￿lls
these requirements and implements the ￿rst-best optimum. On the con-
trary, price-cap and revenue-cap regulation lead to either underinvestment
or high information rents to the DNO.
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11 Introduction
In Europe, many low-voltage networks will become obsolete within ten to ￿fteen
years. The imminent depreciation of existing networks requires that distribution
network operators (DNOs) invest in new network infrastructure. Concerns arise
whether DNOs will invest optimally, particularly in the optimal network size
when replacing their old infrastructure with a new one. These concerns arise
for two reasons.
First, DNOs face large uncertainty about the di⁄usion of new technologies.
Uncertainty concerns the propagation of small-scale distributed generation (DG)
that may be an important driver of network costs. Depending on the cost and
the e¢ ciency of DG technologies, such as solar photovoltaic (PV), micro-CHP,
and heat pumps,1 electricity production by households may become a driver of
network capacity. However, the replacement of polluting cars by new clean elec-
tric cars may also substantially raise households￿consumption of electricity. The
uncertainty about future demand for network capacity may a⁄ect investment
into the network because network investments are lumpy, with high investment
costs, and have the economic lifetime of 40 to 50 years. This implies that if the
invested capacity becomes insu¢ cient in the meantime, extending the network
with additional cables is extremely expensive.2
Second, regulation in￿ uences the DNOs￿investment incentives. Regulation
can improve incentives by adequately taking into account the e⁄ects of new
technological developments and the relating uncertainty. The current regulatory
practices with respect to DG vary over Europe. For instance, energy regulators
in the Netherlands and the UK, have already been considering DG as a potential
cost driver. They allow higher revenues to DNOs that have a larger amount of
DG connected to the network (see NMa 2010 and Jamasb and Marantes 2011).3
Furthermore, DNOs in the UK may also impose user tari⁄s on DG, while in the
Netherlands this tari⁄ is set at zero by law (Niesten 2010 and De Joode et al.
2010). In most other EU countries, the regulation does not account for DG and
there are no tari⁄s for DG producers (Nieuwenhout et al. 2010).
Taking both these factors into consideration, we address three questions.
First, what is the socially optimal level of investment under uncertainty about
the development of DG technologies? Second, how can it be implemented by ex-
ante regulation? Finally, what are the e⁄ects of other commonly used regulatory
regimes, and why are these regimes suboptimal under uncertainty?
We analyze these questions in a one-shot sequential game theoretical model
with households, a DNO, and the regulator. Households consume and produce
electricity by employing DG devices at home. Both consumption and production
￿ uctuate over time, and the maximum of the peak electricity in￿ ow (peak-
consumption) and out￿ ow (peak-production) determines the amount of network
1Strictly speaking, heat pumps are not considered as DG-technologies, but they produce
electricity as well, similarly to DG.
2This is especially true for underground cables because the costs of digging into the ground
to lay cables down are substantial.
3In the Netherlands, only mid- and large-scale DG producers are considered.
2capacity a household needs to buy (measured in kW). Ex ante, the households￿
peak-consumption is known to all players, but there is uncertainty about DG.
In particular, the DG state may turn out to be either low or high. The DNO
invests under uncertainty, after which it observes the realized state and sets
network tari⁄s for households. We allow for a three-part tari⁄, consisting of
two separate linear network-capacity tari⁄s on peak-consumption and peak-
production and a ￿xed fee.4 Similarly to other theoretical papers on incentive
regulation (e.g., Lewis and Sappington 1988), we assume that the information
about the realized state of DG is private to the DNO and cannot be veri￿ed by
the regulator. In practice, the regulator observes only aggregated information
about households￿peaks, since collecting detailed information on the allocation
of DG and consumption peaks over the entire network would involve substantial
costs.
Therefore, the regulator cannot write a contract conditional on the DG state.
We ￿nd that if a high future DG production is likely ￿for instance because
DG technologies will become cheaper or DG will generate high revenues ￿then
the optimal network capacity is fully determined by DG peak and exceeds the
capacity that is needed for peak-consumption.5 We distinguish this situation
as a DG-driven network and further focus on it as it represents the most rel-
evant case for us.6 Due to uncertainty, it is optimal in this case to install the
amount of network capacity that is not fully used in the low DG state in or-
der to be able to accommodate more DG in the high state. In the high state,
the DG peak is higher than the consumption peak and there is no excess ca-
pacity. This optimum represents the ￿rst-best solution. The relating optimal
linear tari⁄ on DG capacity - in contrast with the most common EU practice,
which is zero - is positive while the linear tari⁄ on peak-consumption is zero.
These tari⁄s encourage optimal network usage and can be seen as an alternative
to physical demand rationing, such as network service interruptions. Further-
more, the DG tari⁄ contains a mark-up due to uncertainty; therefore, the ￿xed
charge is negative in order to reduce the relating rents of the DNO. In the low-
production state, the network capacity exceeds households￿peak-consumption
and -production. Therefore, both linear tari⁄s become zero, and the positive
￿xed fee compensates for the optimal excess network capacity installed under
uncertainty.
We also argue that since the DNO has superior information on the allocation
of households￿peaks, the regulator can make use of this information by o⁄ering
an option menu. An option menu contains three-part tari⁄s for each potential
state of the world, which tari⁄s correspond to optimal prices. In this way, the
option menu can implement the ￿rst-best optimum. Our results also show that
current regulatory practices di⁄er from the optimal pricing scheme. With no
4This tari⁄ structure is ￿exible and is often used in network industries (see e.g., La⁄ont
and Tirole 1991, Lewis and Sappington 1988).
5Chen et al. (2006) have put a similar argument forward.
6If consumption determines network capacity, then the DNO invests under certainty and
sets a single positive consumption and zero DG tari⁄. The regulator can also observe demand
and determine the respective single price cap.
3price discretion, as in the case of price-cap regulation, the DNO earns a high
information rent. At the other extreme, full price discretion, such as under
revenue-cap regulation, ruins investment incentives by allowing the DNO to
increase pro￿ts by simply rationing household demand for network capacity by
means of high tari⁄s.
Relating literature
Due to the novelty of the problem, no economic literature exists that ana-
lyzes the e⁄ects of regulation on investment in distributed generation by house-
holds and in the optimal network size by the DNO under uncertain demand.
Nonetheless, our results relate to the literature on incentive regulation, partic-
ularly about information problems on the demand side of the market.
First of all, the literature on optimal investments of regulated monopolies
under uncertain demand is limited. Dobbs (2004) shows that intertemporal
price-cap regulation provides little investment incentives for the DNO. Since
Dobbs analyzes the optimal timing of investments, his results about delayed
investments can be translated as underinvestment for our case. However, his
paper does not consider asymmetric information about demand and does not
specify optimal regulation.
Second, a somewhat more extensive literature exists that analyzes the e⁄ects
of asymmetric information about demand on pricing decisions and determines
the relating optimal regulation. Lewis and Sappington (1988) analyze a single-
product monopoly when ￿xed fees are possible. They recommend an option
menu and thus price discretion if the ￿rm￿ s marginal costs are non-decreasing
because then the monopoly can employ its superior knowledge about demand
when setting prices and achieve the ￿rst-best outcome. The most important
di⁄erences between Lewis and Sappington (1988) and our paper are that we
consider multiple products - peak-consumption and -production - and the in-
vestment decisions of regulated monopolies
Regarding the ￿rst di⁄erence, the two-product model of Armstrong and
Vickers (2000) is more closely related to our analysis. They ￿nd that whether
price discretion is necessary depends on the nature of demand shocks, and how
shocks in￿ uence price elasticities. However, compared to our paper, they as-
sume information asymmetry relating to both products and no ￿xed fees (i.e.,
only second-best optimum is possible). Because of these di⁄erences, we ￿nd
unambiguously that to achieve the ￿rst-best optimum, the DNO should be of-
fered price discretion in the form of an option menu consisting of two sets of
three-part tari⁄s.
In addition, Armstrong and Vickers also do not consider incentives for in-
vestment, particularly under uncertainty about demand, which makes our result
di⁄erent from the standard literature on incentive regulation under unknown de-
mand.
Finally, our results about o⁄ering multiple products resembles the peak-load
pricing literature (see e.g., Crew et al. 1995). According to this literature, the
optimal peak-period tari⁄ is higher than the o⁄-peak tari⁄ because peak drives
network costs. In our case of a DG-driven network, DG determines network
capacity, and therefore, the linear tari⁄ on DG should be higher than the linear
4tari⁄ on peak-consumption.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe our model. We ￿nd
the social optimum in Section 3 and the relating optimal regulation in section 4.
We evaluate several commonly used regulatory regimes in Section 5. In Section
6, we discuss policy implications. In Section 7, we draw conclusions.
2 Model
A monopoly distribution network operator (DNO) provides network infrastruc-
ture in a local area, through which households can transport electricity. We con-
sider them as homogenous and therefore from now on focus on a representative
household. A household is a consumer and a producer of electricity. We refer to
the household￿ s electricity production as distributed generation (DG), for which
it needs to install one type of DG-devices, such as solar PVs or micro-CHP.7
The household has to buy also network capacity to be able to ￿ ow electricity
out of and into the network at any moment in time. This capacity can be seen
as the size or the number of cables laid down between the transformer and the
household, and is measured in kW. Peaks in consumption and production over
the entire period determine this capacity. We assume that the future cost of
installing DG devices can be high or low, thus reducing or increasing peak DG
production, respectively. The future development of DG technologies and so the
costs are unknown the DNO at the time of investment in a new network. There-
fore, to determine the network size, the DNO maximizes its expected pro￿t.
The DG cost is revealed to the DNO and the household only after the net-
work has been built. Then the DNO o⁄ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the
household, who in turn either accepts or rejects it. The contract speci￿es lin-
ear tari⁄s for peak-consumption and peak-production, and a ￿xed fee. As we
mentioned in the introduction, this type of non-linear pricing is commonly used
in network industries. The linear tari⁄s control network usage and, therefore,
represent an alternative to other forms of rationing, such as licenses or bans.
At the same time, a ￿xed fee allows for the e¢ cient marginal-cost pricing and
can be used as an instrument to redistribute welfare between the DNO and
households.
Furthermore, the DNO￿ s tari⁄s are subject to regulation. Similarly to the
analyses of monopoly regulation with unknown demands by Lewis and Sapping-
ton (1988) and Armstrong and Vickers (2000), we assume that actual demands
are not observable by the regulator, although it can be veri￿ed that the ￿rm is
serving all demand at its prices. The regulator has to face high costs in order
to observe the actual allocation of peak-consumption and -production over the
entire network. This means that regulatory contracts that use ex post informa-
tion on realized demand are infeasible. In particular, global price-cap regulation
7In this model, we only focus on the presence of new technologies in the production side.
We could model consumption-side developments, such as electric cars, in a similar way.
5whereby the regulator caps the average price o⁄ered by the ￿rm using the real-
ized outputs as weights is ruled out. Therefore, we restrict our attention to ex
ante regulation regimes. Optimal regulation should be such that it motivates































Figure 1. Timing of decisions
We solve this model (illustrated also in Figure 1) by backward induction for
two cases. First, we calculate the social optimum as if the regulator operated the
DNO and could choose the network capacity and set prices conditional on the
DG cost (Section 3). After that, we determine the optimal regulatory contract
(Section 4).
2.1 Representative household
We assume that households are homogeneous, therefore we consider a single
representative household. This household consumes and produces electricity.
Since electricity consumption and production patterns are stochastic and their
peak and o⁄-peak moments vary in time, consumption may reach its peak at the
moment when there is no production, and vice versa. For example, a solar panel
does not produce electricity in the dark evening hours, while consumption may
reach its maximum in these hours of the day. On the contrary, at the production
peak, which is at daylight, the household may consume very little electricity. A
reliable connection to the network has to be such that it accommodates peak-
consumption and -production at any moment in time, therefore even in cases
when only consumption or production occurs and at the same time peaks. To
take this worst-case scenario into consideration, we argue that the household￿ s
maximum load approximates peak-consumption q or peak-production z, both
measured in kW.8
8The following mathematical formulation underlies this argument. Let Q(t) and Z(t) de-
note consumption and production load at time t, respectively. The network capacity a house-
hold buys should be as large as it allows for the maximum di⁄erence between consumption
and production loads over time, that is, maxt jQ(t) ￿ Z(t)j. Using our notations, we know
6We assume that households derive utility from both products q and z, and
their preferences are separable in them. On top of that, the household has to
pay to the DNO to be able to transport electricity into and out of the network.
Demand for peak-consumption and -production will therefore depend on these
utilities and the capacity tari⁄s.
We denote the household￿ s preferences for q by the net utility function v(q):
Since the household can only increase peak-consumption by having more electric
equipment at home, which is increasingly expensive, we assume that the net
utility function has an inverted-U shape with a global maximum at qmax =
argmaxv(q) > 0.9
Similarly, we assume that the household￿ s net utility of z is expressed by the
function p(z). Since the produced electricity can be sold in the market,10 this net
utility is simply the pro￿t that a household can make at a given peak-production.
For simplicity, we assume that the revenue is expressed by a linear function rz.
In addition, costs can be seen as relating to a single ￿xed investment, however, z
determines the size of investment. Therefore, DG costs depend on z. For simple
exposition, we express DG costs by the convex function
cz(1+z)
2 , where r;c > 0:
Consequently, we obtain the following quadratic functional form: p(z) = rz ￿
cz(1+z)
2 :11 This function has a global maximum at the point zmax = (r￿c=2)=c:
Due to the uncertainty about the future development of DG technologies,
the DG-cost parameter c is initially unknown, only its distribution is common
knowledge. This parameter can take two values: cH corresponds to low DG costs
and consequently high DG state (H) and cL corresponds to high DG costs and
so low DG state (L). The probability of cH and cL is ￿ and 1￿￿, respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that cL = 2r; implying that DG is
not pro￿table in the low state: zL = 0. Furthermore, we assume that cH < 2r;
so that zmax;H > 0: Because no DG production occurs in state L, we drop the
indices H;L next to c and z. Therefore, state H is characterized by the low cost
parameter c and the relating peak-production z and net pro￿t p(z) ￿ 0; and
state L is characterized by no production.
The household decides how much q and z to buy from the DNO. We assume
that the DNO charges the household three-part tari⁄s, comprising linear tari⁄s
that q = maxt Q(t) and z = maxt Z(t): It is also plausible to assume that there are moments
when consumption and production is zero: mint Q(t) = mint Z(t) = 0. As a consequence, it
may occur that for ^ t = argmaxQ(t) : Z(^ t) = 0 and for ~ t = argmaxZ(t) : Q(~ t) = 0, where ^ t 6=
~ t: It then follows that maxt jQ(t) ￿ Z(t)j = maxt jQ(t);Z(t)j = max(q;z):
9The function v(q) satis￿es the following conditions: v(0) = 0; v0 ￿ 0 for q ￿ qmax and
v0 < 0 otherwise; v00 < 0.
10We assume that the household is price taker, and therefore, the electricity price is ex-
ogenously given. We also assume that the household￿ s total electricity production (kWh) is
proportional to its peak-production (kW). However, we ignore the possibility that the house-
hold may optimize its peak-production by switching DG facilities on and o⁄. Therefore we do
not model the actual electricity production decisions of households.
11The function p(z) satis￿es: p(0) = 0; p0 ￿ 0 for z ￿ zmax and p0 < 0 otherwise; p00 < 0.
7on peak-consumption and peak-production, and a ￿xed fee:12;13
(tqL;0;tL) in the low-production state, (1)
(tqH;tz;tH) in the high-production state.
While linear tari⁄s are assumed to be non-negative, we allow the ￿xed fee to
take both positive and negative values. A negative ￿xed charge is in fact a lump-
sum transfer that the network owner makes to households. Such transfers are
feasible in reality and can be imposed by the regulator.14 We can now express
the household￿ s surplus in each state as follows:
H : S(tqH;tz;tH) = v(qH) + p(z) ￿ tqHqH ￿ tzz ￿ tH;
L : S(tqL;0;tL) = v(qL) ￿ tqLqL ￿ tL:
We can determine the household￿ s demand for q and z by maximizing these sur-
plus functions. Maximization yields the following ￿rst order conditions (FOCs):
v0
i = v0(qi) = tqi for i = L;H and p0 = p0(z) = tz. By inversion, we obtain the
respective demand functions: qi = q(tqi) for i = L;H and z = z(tz). Further-
more, the linear tari⁄s need to satisfy the conditions tqi < v0(0) and tz < p0(0)
so that the household has a positive net-utility from buying these products. In
addition, for q and z always satis￿es that q ￿ qmax and z ￿ zmax. We as-
sume that the household rejects the contract that the DNO o⁄ers and buys no
network capacity if its surplus is negative (S(tqH;tz;tH) < 0;S(tqL;0;tL) < 0).
2.2 DNO
The monopoly DNO invests in a new local network and delivers network services
to households. Even though households are homogenous with respect to their
preferences, they may have di⁄erent consumption and production patterns that
a⁄ect the aggregated demand for network services, called the network load. We
￿rst derive the maximum load, and then determine the DNO￿ s optimization
problem.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the households are also homoge-
nous with respect to their electricity consumption pro￿le. Therefore, the aggre-
gated peak-consumption on the network projected to a representative consumer
is also q. With respect to DG, we assume that the households￿DG peaks do
not necessarily coincide, which is why the total production peak per household
may be less than z. We express that by ￿z, where ￿ (0 < ￿ ￿ 1) is a parameter
12By setting separate prices on q and z, we assume that the DNO is able to measure
consumption and production peaks separately. In practice, this is the case with smart meters.
13We set the linear tari⁄s for peak-production in the low state as zero because the maximum
peak-production in that state is zero, which will not be a⁄ected by any other value of the DG
tari⁄.
14Also, in unregulated businesses, companies sometimes make such transfers to consumers:
think of free phones provided by telecom operators or presents to new subscribers.
8re￿ ecting the degree of simultaneity in DG production.15;16 This implies that
the maximum load on the entire network is equal to max(q;￿z): We assume that
providing q and z on the network has no cost.
We denote the total network capacity installed by the DNO by k. We assume
that the investment costs are C(k) = Ck, where C is the marginal cost of
building network capacity. For simplicity, we do not include ￿xed investment
costs. If this cost is positive, it is simply covered by the ￿xed fee. We additionally
introduce the technical assumption that C < v0(0) to guarantee that the problem
has a non-trivial solution.
The DG state becomes known to the DNO before it sets prices to the house-
hold. However, the decision on k is taken under uncertainty. Therefore, the
DNO maximizes pro￿ts in both production states with respect to three-part
tari⁄s (1):
H : ￿H ￿ ￿(tqH;tz;tH;k) = tqHqH + tzz + tH ￿ Ck;
L : ￿L ￿ ￿(tqL;0;tL;k) = tqLqL + tL ￿ Ck:
To determine network capacity, the DNO maximizes its expected pro￿t:
E￿(:) = ￿￿(tqH;tz;tH;k) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(tqL;0;tL;k):
where ￿ is the probability of high DG production.
We assume that outages and non-price rationing of demand for capacity are
not allowed in any state of the world. Therefore, the network capacity should
be su¢ cient for peak-consumption and peak-production in both states:
k ￿ qH ￿ 0; (2)
k ￿ qL ￿ 0;
k ￿ ￿z ￿ 0:
2.3 Regulator
The regulator maximizes the weighted sum of the households￿expected surplus
and the DNO￿ s expected pro￿t:
EW(RC) = ￿ (SH(RC) + ￿￿H(RC)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(SL(RC) + ￿￿L(RC)); (3)
where ￿ is the probability of high DG production, RC stands for the regulatory
contract o⁄ered to the ￿rm, and ￿ denotes the weight on pro￿t, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. If
15Here the simultaneity coe¢ cients are constant and do not depend on the number of
network users. This is a reasonable assumption, since in practice, the ratio of per household
network capacity and the respective individual peaks converges to a constant value as the
number of households increases.
16For example, if individual DG peaks of households are fully correlated (￿ = 1), such as
the case for solar PV, each household has its peak at the same time. Then the e⁄ective
contribution of each household to the peak-load on the network coincides with the individual
production peak: ￿z = z. In contrast, when individual peaks are spread over time (￿ < 1),
e.g., in the case of micro-CHP or heat pumps, then the household￿ s e⁄ective contribution to
the peak-load becomes smaller: ￿z < z.
9￿ = 0, the regulator only cares about households and is indi⁄erent about how
much pro￿t the DNO obtains. If ￿ = 1, the regulator equally weighs household
surplus and the DNO￿ s pro￿t, as if households fully owned the ￿rm.
We consider two cases: ￿rst, we ￿nd the social optimum as if the regula-
tor operated the DNO and could choose the network capacity and set prices
conditional on the DG cost; and second, we determine the optimal regulatory
contract. In each case, the regulator has to consider several constraints to
guarantee the physical and ￿nancial feasibility of the DNO￿ s operation in every
production state.
To determine the social optimum, the regulator needs to meet capacity con-
straints (2).
Besides, we assume that the DNO has limited liability, implying that pro￿ts
should be non-negative in any state of the world. The reason for using this
assumption is as follows. Even though the ￿rm signs the contract with the
regulator before knowing which production state will occur, it sets prices after
learning the realized production state, such as the case in Armstrong and Vickers
(2000) and La⁄ont and Martimort (2002). This means that the regulatory
contract should satisfy the following participation constraints:
￿(tqL;0;tL;k) ￿ 0; (4)
￿(tqH;tz;tL;k) ￿ 0: (5)
When determining the optimal contract, the regulator also needs to take
the above mentioned constraints into consideration. In addition, the regulator
wants to make use of the DNO￿ s private information. Therefore, the regulatory
contract has to provide su¢ cient incentives for the DNO to set tari⁄s according
to the realize state of the world. An option menu ful￿lls this goal (see, Joskow
2008). In the o⁄ered option menu, each three-part tari⁄ is designated for one
production state. Hence, it has to be designed in a way that the DNO has











denote the tari⁄s intended for the high-production state. Therefore, tari⁄s must
satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints of the DNO:17
H : TH
q qH + TH
z zH + TH > TL
q qL + TL
z zL + TL (6)
L : TL
q qL + TL > TH
q qH + TH:
3 First-best optimum
In this section, we calculate the social optimum as if the DNO had no informa-
tion advantage and the regulator could choose the amount of capacity and set
prices. First, we determine the equilibrium and then we analyze its character-
istics.
17Network costs also a⁄ect the pro￿ts of the DNO, however they are the same in every state
(Ck) and therefore fall out of the inequalities.
103.1 Equilibrium
Similarly to tari⁄s (1), we denote the regulated prices as (TqH;Tz;TH) and
(TqL;0;TL) in the high- and low-production states, respectively. The regulator￿ s
objective function is:
EW(TqH;TqL;Tz;TL;TH;k) =
= ￿ (S(TqH;Tz;TH) + ￿￿(TqH;Tz;TH;k))
+(1 ￿ ￿)(S(TqL;0;TL) + ￿￿(TqL;0;TL;k))
The regulator maximizes social welfare subject to capacity constraints (2) and
participation constraints (4) and (5). The DNO￿ s non-negative pro￿t conditions
always bind, thus we obtain that the optimal ￿xed charges exactly compensate
for the part of network costs that are not covered by the linear prices: TL =




f￿ (v(qH) + p(z) ￿ Ck) + (1 ￿ ￿)(v(qL) ￿ Ck) (7)
+￿qH (k ￿ qH) + ￿qL (k ￿ qL) + ￿z (k ￿ ￿z)g:
The ￿rst observation from this expression is that the equilibrium value of the
expected welfare does not depend on ￿, that is, how the regulator weighs pro￿ts.
This occurs because the DNO makes zero pro￿t in every state.
From (7), the ￿rst order conditions (FOCs) are:
@
@qL
: (1 ￿ ￿)v0(qL) = ￿qL (8)
@
@qH
: ￿v0(qH) = ￿qH (9)
@
@z
: ￿p0(z) = ￿z￿ (10)
@
@k
: ￿qH + ￿qL + ￿z = C (11)
By using equations (8) and (9), we can show that qL = qH. We prove this by
showing that qL 6= qH is impossible. Suppose qL < qH. Then the capacity
restriction on qL cannot be binding: k￿qL > 0, and therefore, the shadow price
of this capacity restriction must be zero, ￿qL = 0. Substituting this in the ￿rst
FOC, we obtain that v0(qL) = 0. Therefore, qL = qmax, which contradicts to
our presumption that qL < qH: Similarly, qL > qH is also impossible. Therefore,
they must be equal: qL = qH = q. As a consequence, the social planner sets
the same linear charge on peak-consumption in both states: TqL = TqH =
Tq. This result arises since the prices are set after the network has been laid
down. Consequently, from a social perspective, it is better to increase network
utilization as much as possible, rather than ration the network load by setting
a higher price in some state.
11By combining and simplifying (8)-(11), we obtain the following set of equa-
tions determining the equilibrium quantities of both products, q￿;z￿ and the








Based on (12), we formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let k￿ denote the solution of (12). There may be three types
of optimal networks in equilibrium, which are characterized by the following





￿ ) > C; (ii) consumption-driven network: ￿z￿ = ￿zmax < k￿ = q￿
if v0(￿zmax) > C; (iii) network-cost-driven network: q￿ = ￿z￿ = k￿ for all other
speci￿cations.
As capacity increases, both term in the left-hand side (LHS) of expression
(12) decreases. It is, therefore, optimal to increase network capacity as long as
the total marginal bene￿ts from an additional capacity unit are still above the
marginal cost, up to the point when they become equal to each other. At some
level of network capacity, the net utility from one product may reach satiation
(i.e., one term in the LHS of expression (12) turns to zero), while the marginal
utility of the other product (i.e., the other term in the LHS of expression (12))
still exceeds the marginal network cost C. In such a case, any further increase
in network capacity is purely driven by the second product.
A similar result is known in the literature on peak-load pricing (see Crew
et al. 1995). In this literature, the same physical facility is used to produce at
two periods: ￿ peak￿and ￿ o⁄-peak￿ , which are treated as two di⁄erent products.
It is namely the ￿ peak￿period that determines the capacity in equilibrium and
bears the infrastructure costs. Our result resembles the same principle. In a
DG-driven network, z drives network capacity and hence needs to bear network
costs. In a consumption-driven network, q corresponds to the ￿ peak￿period. A
network-cost-driven network represents a special case, in which both products
drive network capacity.
As a consequence of Proposition 1, in DG-driven networks, the optimal net-
work size exceeds the peak-load in the low-production state. This excess capac-
ity (￿z￿ ￿ qmax) is necessary because of the uncertain DG production. On the
contrary, in consumption- and network-cost-driven networks no excess capacity
is necessary in any state of the world because peak-consumption, which is (also)
the determinant of network size, is certain.
Given that v0(q) = Tq;p0(z) = Tz and TL = Ck￿TqLqL, TH = Ck￿TqHqH￿
Tzz, the optimal tari⁄s in the case of di⁄erent network types write:









Network-cost- L (v0(q￿);0;(C ￿ v0(q￿))q￿)
driven H (v0(q￿);p0(z￿);(C ￿ v0(q￿))q￿ ￿ p0(z￿)z￿)
(13)
In the case of a consumption-driven network, optimal tari⁄s reduce to a single
linear tari⁄ on q, because the network size and the load is determined by peak-
consumption, which is common knowledge and so uncertainty plays no role in
the optimal decision. Consequently, Tq exactly covers the marginal cost and
Tz = 0. In addition, the transfer is also zero because of certainty: the DNO
makes no pro￿t or loss that has to be compensated for. This case can be also
seen as a benchmark under certainty about demand.
In the case of a DG-driven network in the high state, the linear fee on DG
contains a mark-up, which is due to uncertainty. The more likely it is that DG
becomes cheap, the smaller the mark-up will be. As a consequence of a mark-
up, in the high state the ￿xed-fee is negative: it distributes the excess pro￿t due
to this mark-up back to the household. In the low state, the household simply
pays a positive transfer that covers network costs. Tari⁄s on peak-consumption
can be set at zero because this capacity never exceeds peak-production and thus
the network size.
In a network-cost-driven network, tari⁄s satisfy Tq +
￿Tz
￿ = C. This expres-
sion shows that Tq < C, implying that TL > 0: Yet, TH ? 0 depending on the
magnitude of the marginal network cost C.
Our results correspond to the ￿rst-best social optimum. The maximum
expected social welfare is:
EW￿ = v(q￿) + ￿p(z￿) ￿ Ck￿: (14)
3.2 Comparative statics
Let us now analyze how the values of certain parameters a⁄ect the optimal
network size k￿ and the occurrence of di⁄erent network types. We are partic-
ularly interested in the e⁄ects of DG-cost parameter c, its probability ￿, the
marginal network cost C, and the DG technology dependent simultaneity of
peak-production ￿.
Taking derivatives of the ￿rst implicit function in (12) with respect to these
parameters allows us to evaluate these e⁄ects, which are summarized in the
following proposition (for the proof see Appendix 8.1):
13Proposition 2 The optimal network capacity k￿ is non-decreasing in ￿ and
non-increasing in C and c. The e⁄ect of a marginal change in parameter ￿ on
k is generally not monotonous and depends on the relative coe¢ cients of risk
aversion of function p in equilibrium. In particular, k￿ is non-decreasing in ￿
as long as the relative coe¢ cient of risk aversion of function p is smaller than
1.
To interpret the proposition, let us focus our attention on a DG-driven net-
work, which is the most relevant case in our analysis. There, in the social
optimum k￿ = ￿z￿. It implies that the network capacity and peak-production
are proportional to each other. First, we analyze the e⁄ects of ￿ and C. We can
easily see that the optimal tari⁄ households pay for peak-production, Tz =
￿C
￿
is ceteris paribus decreasing in the probability of low DG cost and increasing in
the network cost. The smaller the ￿, the larger the expected marginal network
cost is. It implies a higher mark-up and a lower optimal peak-production and
network size. Similarly, a larger marginal network cost has to be covered by a
larger linear tari⁄ that reduces z and k.
Second, DG-cost parameter c only indirectly in￿ uences peak-production. We
know that the marginal net utility p0 is monotonously decreasing in c, that is,
the larger the c, the less marginal net utility a household obtains for a given
peak-production. As a consequence, for a given tari⁄, a larger DG cost implies
a smaller optimal peak-production and network size.
Finally, e⁄ect of the simultaneity factor ￿ is not monotonous. On the one
hand, the more production peaks coincide, the larger the e⁄ective marginal
network cost (￿C) is, lowering peak-production in equilibrium. On the other
hand, for peak-production that largely correlate, for instance as in the case of
solar PV, a larger network capacity is required. Therefore, whether network
capacity increases or decreases depends on the relative magnitude of these two
opposite e⁄ects. For peak-production substantially lower than at satiation, the
network capacity is non-decreasing in ￿. In practice, it indicates a larger network
in the case of solar PV, where peaks coincide (high ￿), than a network mainly
with micro-CHP, where peaks distribute more evenly during the day (lower ￿).
For peak-production close to satiation, the opposite result holds.
4 Optimal regulation: an option menu
It is a well-known result in the literature that in the case of homogenous con-
sumers and the ￿rm having complete information about the demand, an unreg-
ulated monopoly sets total network capacity and linear tari⁄s at the e¢ cient
level if it is allowed to charge a ￿xed fee (see e.g., Lewis and Sappington 1988
and also Appendix 8.3 for our model). Then the ￿rm appropriates household
surplus by this ￿xed fee and achieves a positive pro￿t. If the regulator values
consumer surplus just somewhat more than the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t (￿ < 1 in expression
(3)), a positive pro￿t creates an expected welfare loss compared to our social
14optimum (14):
￿EWUR = (1 ￿ ￿)(v(q￿) + ￿p(z￿) ￿ Ck￿) > 0; (15)
where UR stands for the unregulated monopoly case. This welfare loss necessi-
tates regulation.
However, as we discussed in Section 2.3, the regulator has an information
disadvantage compared to the DNO. The regulator can reduce the information
rent to the minimum by o⁄ering an option menu because it allows the monopoly
some level of price discretion (see also Lewis and Sappington 1988 and Arm-
strong and Vickers 2000).










denotes the tari⁄s intended for the
high-production state. For this contract, several constraints need to satisfy:
capacity constraints (2), participation constraints (4) and (5), and incentive
compatibility constraints (6).
In the proposition, we show that given these constraints the regulator can
design an option menu for the DNO in such a way that in achieves the ￿rst-best
optimum. In other words, the ￿rm will accept this o⁄er, install the optimal
amount of capacity k￿, and, depending on the production state realized, picks
the three-part tari⁄ within the menu that leads to maximum welfare (see the
proof in Appendix 8.2).










= (Tq;Tz;T ￿ Tzz￿);
where Tq = v0(q￿); Tz = p0(z￿), and T = Ck￿ ￿ Tqq￿ are the socially optimal
tari⁄s based on quantities computed from (12).
As a consequence, tari⁄s in the option menu correspond to the tari⁄s in the
social planner￿ s case (13).
This means that the regulation will be able to achieve the ￿rst-best optimum:
the socially optimal level of capacity and its utilization despite its information
disadvantage about the demand. Compared to the standard literature on incen-
tive regulation, which most commonly receives second-best optimum, we obtain
the ￿rst-best outcome for two reasons. First, the DNO is allowed to set a ￿xed
fee that enables e¢ cient (marginal cost) pricing for both products and achieves
optimal utilization and investment incentives. Second, the investment costs are
known by the regulator (the information asymmetry is present on the demand
side), therefore the regulator does not need to face e¢ ciency losses. Since two
states are possible, the DNO has some level of price discretion and can choose
a contract according to the realized demand state. Consequently, the DNO￿ s
information rent reduces to zero. Note also that the tari⁄s in the menu depend
only on model parameters, not on other values (e.g., not on the DNO￿ s realized
revenue, which may be observable by the regulator).
155 Evaluating common regulatory schemes
In this section, we consider two commonly used ex ante regulatory schemes:
three-part-price-cap and revenue-cap regulation. By analyzing these regulatory
schemes, we can explain why ￿ no￿or ￿ full￿price discretion is suboptimal in the
presence of uncertainty about DG.
5.1 Three-part price cap
From Section 3.1, we know that in the case of a consumption-driven network,
the presence of uncertainty does not in￿ uence the equilibrium outcome and
therefore, a single three-part tari⁄ can implement the social optimum without
any welfare loss: ￿EWPC
cons = 0, where PC stands for price cap and cons refers
to a consumption-driven network.
For the other two network types, a single three-part-tari⁄cap cannot achieve
the social optimum. In order to obtain optimal network capacity and its e¢ -
cient utilization in the high state, the regulator can set the linear tari⁄s on q
and z equal to the e¢ cient linear tari⁄s: Tq = v0(q￿) and Tz = p0(z￿), where
v0(q￿) +
￿
￿p0(z￿) = C: Households will then demand the optimal amounts of
both products (q￿;z￿), which forces the ￿rm to install the optimal amount of
network capacity k￿. However, the ￿rm will only accept such a contract if the
single lump-sum transfer provides non-negative pro￿ts in both states. This ￿xed
fee needs to be positive in order to guarantee that, the ￿rm breaks even in the
low-production state. With this fee the DNO earns a positive pro￿t in the high
state. This positive pro￿t is due to the information advantage of the DNO.
Consequently, the expected welfare loss corresponds to the information rent of
the DNO and thus depends on ￿:
￿EWPC
DG=cost = (1 ￿ ￿)￿Tzz￿ > 0 (16)
where DG=cost refers to a DG- or a network-cost-driven network.
Let us now consider how Tz = 0, as commonly used in the EU, a⁄ects
network capacity and social welfare. If the regulator sets Tz = 0, then the
demand for product z in the high-production state is equal to zmax. This exceeds
the optimal quantity in both DG-driven and network-cost-driven networks. To
meet this demand, the DNO would need to install k = zmax, which implies an
overinvestment. The ￿rm will only be willing to accept a regulatory contract
(i.e., to break even and deliver reliable service) if the transfer covers the cost
Czmax. In the high state, it again implies a positive information rent. To sum
up, zero linear tari⁄ on peak-production leads to overinvestment and welfare
loss due to extra rents to the ￿rm. Consequently, the welfare loss is even higher
than (16).
5.2 Revenue-cap regulation
Suppose that the DNO is free to set its tari⁄s, but the regulator caps the
revenue it makes. Let R denote this revenue cap. If the revenue cap is not
16binding, the DNO acts as in the unregulated case, that is, it sets e¢ cient linear
prices that induce the socially optimal peak-consumption and -production, and
appropriates total consumer surplus by the ￿xed fee (see Appendix 8.3). If
household and the DNO￿ s surpluses are valued equally (￿ = 1), this solution
is socially optimal. However, if household surplus has a higher weight in total
welfare (￿ < 1), the welfare loss equals (15):
￿EWRC = ￿EWUR:
If the revenue cap is binding, the DNO￿ s pro￿t can be expressed as R￿Ck:
The DNO will still extract maximum surplus but now it will also minimize its
investment costs. Because it cannot make as large pro￿t as in the unregulated
case, it will invest less. Furthermore, the ￿xed fee will leave the household
without any surplus. Consequently, the regulator is better o⁄ by not imposing
a more stringent revenue cap on the ￿rm.18
5.3 Summary
In this section, we analyzed the e⁄ects of two di⁄erent ex ante regulatory regimes
on the network size and social welfare. We have shown that each of these
regimes is suboptimal in comparison to the option menu proposed in Section
4. A single three-part tari⁄ cap can implement the social optimum only in the
case of a consumption-driven network because there the information problem
is not present. Otherwise allowing no price discretion leads to a welfare loss
due to the information rent of the DNO: the optimal network size can only be
achieved by allowing the ￿rm to earn a positive pro￿t in the high-production
state. Revenue-cap regulation achieves the socially optimal network size only if
the revenue cap is not binding, but this case is equivalent to the unregulated
monopoly case; and therefore, as long as the regulator attaches some value to
consumer surplus, there is a welfare loss. Under a stricter revenue cap that is
set below the monopoly revenue, the DNO will underinvest and still abstract
the remaining surplus away from households. As a consequence, a high level of
price discretion leaves the DNO with its monopoly pro￿t.
6 Policy implications and further discussion
In our analysis, we showed that the regulator, when setting regulatory con-
straints, needs to take into account the expected developments in the electricity
sector. The major policy implications from our result are the following. First,
18The regulator may also restrict tari⁄s to linear only, that is, the ￿xed fee Ti = 0;i = H;L.
It can be easily shown that again a non-binding revenue constraint, i.e., the unregulated case
leads to the highest network capacity. This monopoly k is, however, smaller than in the
presence of ￿xed charges. Even though this solution implies underinvestment compared to
the social optimum, if ￿ is (very close to) zero, an unregulated monopoly without ￿xed fees
is socially more desirable than one with ￿xed fees. With ￿xed fees the monopoly extracts
total household surplus, while with linear tari⁄s only the household is left with some positive
surplus.
17with the expected shift from consumption-driven towards DG-driven networks,
DNOs￿costs can no longer be purely born by electricity users, but the burden
needs to be shared with DG producers. Secondly, since the network costs depend
on network load, rather than on the amount of electricity that ￿ ows through the
network, the tari⁄s should be also set on loads (kW), rather than on electricity
consumption or production ￿ ows (kWh). Finally, the DNO has more detailed
information on the distribution of production and consumption peaks over the
network. Therefore, it has an information advantage over the regulator about
the households￿demand for network services, as uncertainty resolves. Regula-
tion by an option menu provides the DNO with incentive to use this information
optimally, and works more e¢ ciently than ￿ traditional￿regulation regimes, such
as pure price-cap regulation, which does not give the possibility to rebalance the
tari⁄s, or revenue-cap regulation, which gives too much freedom to reallocate
costs towards one or another tari⁄.
Note that the current regulatory practices are not fully in line with these
implications. Nieuwenhout et al. (2010) describe currently applied regulatory
strategies in several EU-member states and stress that revising regulation is
necessary to address this issue. Many countries do not impose network charges
on distributed generators (see also De Joode et al. 2010 and Niesten 2010) and
base their regulation on electricity ￿ ow (kWh). This distortion a⁄ects incen-
tives with respect to investment and network utilization for both DG producers
and DNOs, and may potentially cause problems in these countries. However,
some countries have already made adjustments towards including DG in their
regulatory practices. For instance, in the Netherlands, where sliding-scale reg-
ulation is applied, medium-scale DG (such as greenhouses) has already been
included in the benchmarking that determines an upper limit for the allowed
revenues. Furthermore, the tari⁄ structure was adjusted to include prices on
load (per kW) rather than traditional consumption charges (per kWh). Yet,
prices on DG are still set at zero by law. The UK was ahead of other European
countries with introducing new types of regulation. Since 2005, the traditional
price-cap regulation has been extended with new elements, including network
charges (both ￿xed charges and user charges) on generators. Although the idea
of using option menus for resolving information asymmetry is not new (La⁄ont
and Tirole 1993), very few examples in regulatory practice apply this approach.
For instance, in early 1990s in the US, the Federal Communication Commission
tried to introduce a menu for regulating the Bell companies, but this practice
was abandoned after a few years (Vogelsang 2006).
We close this section with a brief discussion of potential further applications
of our results. First, because we model households￿utility on the consump-
tion and production side symmetrically, we predict similar results in the case of
uncertainty relating to increasing consumption, e.g., due to the future expan-
sion of electric cars. In this case, the focus would shift to consumption-driven
networks.19
19Note, however, that assuming uncertainty about peak-production and peak-consumption
will make the problem much more complicated and may change results. See Armstrong and
Vickers (2000).
18Second, although we assumed homogeneous households in our model, our
conclusions are also valid if DG producers may di⁄er in scale, such as house-
holds and greenhouses. Furthermore, the model can be extended to incorporate
di⁄erent DG technologies. In that case, the tari⁄s should be di⁄erentiated by
technology type, so that users of a technology type with a higher load on the
network pay a higher linear charge. Higher linear charges provide an alter-
native to other forms of non-price rationing, such as disconnecting households
that cause high network costs. Another example is solar PVs, which have large
and simultaneous production during sunny summer days, loading the network
heavily in this period. Instead of limiting the number of solar PVs in a region,
the DNO can also reduce DG production by setting a higher linear charge on
peak-production from solar PVs.
Finally, even though our model is a one-shot regulation game, we expect our
results to provide guidance also in a dynamic setting, when the DNO invests in
the ￿rst period and uncertainty resolves gradually, during which the DNO can
constantly adjust tari⁄s. However, if the DNO may invest at any moment in
time, it may delay investments until it knows demand with more certainty (see
e.g., Dobbs 2004).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed optimal investment in DG and network capacity and
optimal regulation under uncertainty about peak DG production. We focused on
the following questions: What is the socially optimal level of investment? Can
it be implemented by ex ante regulation? And, what are the e⁄ects of other
commonly used regulatory regimes on the network size, network utilization, and
social welfare?
First, we ￿nd that if the di⁄usion of DG technologies is very likely, for
instance, because they become cheap or highly pro￿table, peak-production,
rather than peak-consumption, will determine the optimal network size. In
other words, the optimal network capacity is larger than needed for consump-
tion only. However, due to uncertainty, this network capacity is not fully used
in the low DG state. Second, since the DNO has better information about the
future DG production than the regulator, optimal regulation needs to leave the
DNO with some level of price discretion. Consequently, the regulator can reduce
the information rent of the DNO by o⁄ering an option menu. In the optimal
menu, linear charges on peak-consumption and peak-production provide opti-
mal investment incentives and secure e¢ cient network usage in each potential
DG state, and the ￿xed fees compensate for the social costs of uncertainty by
redistributing welfare between the ￿rm and households. We stress that allowing
a positive linear charge on DG production is crucial for creating right investment
and utilization incentives. Finally, the most commonly used ex ante regulatory
regimes, such as a simple price cap or revenue cap, are suboptimal compared
to the optimal option menu because they allow the DNO to earn high pro￿ts,
which may be detrimental to welfare.
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218 Appendix
8.1 Social optimum
Proof. (Proposition 2) For a DG-driven network: Recall that the function
p(z) = rz ￿
cz(1+z)
2 is increasing at a decreasing rate up to the point zmax =
(r￿c=2)=c, and that ￿C < p0(0) = r￿ c
2 > 0, implying that the problem always
results in k > 0.
The FOC of the original problem w.r.t. z writes
￿p
0(k=￿)
￿ ￿ C = 0. We
denote the left-hand side of this FOC by F. Using the rules of implicit function
di⁄erentiation, we obtain dk
dx = ￿
@Fz=@x
@Fz=@k for any parameter of interest x 2







Therefore, for any x, the sign of the derivative dk





































zmax￿z ? 1 is the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion of the net utility function p. While the e⁄ects of C, c and
￿ are monotonous, the e⁄ects of ￿ depend on ￿p(z). If ￿p(z) < 1, then @F
@￿ > 0:
The proposition for the other network types can be proved similarly.
8.2 Optimal regulation
Proof. (Proposition 3) The prices in this contract mimic the prices that
the social planner would choose in the low- and high-production states respec-
tively, and we have shown that those prices correspond to the optimal quantities
(q￿;z￿). Therefore, the DNO must invest in the network capacity that satis-
￿es k￿ ￿ max(q￿;￿z￿). Because the DNO does not gain anything by installing
more or less capacity than needed, it will install exactly the optimal amount:
k￿ = max(q￿;￿z￿):
What remains to be shown is that the incentive compatibility conditions (6)
and the capacity constraints (2) hold. In the case of z￿ = 0; which corresponds
to the consumption-driven network type, both options in the menu become
identical.
Therefore, we only need to check the incentive compatibility constraints for
z￿ > 0: Because TL
q = TH
q = Tq, in the low-production state, the ICC simpli￿es
to TL > T H. In the equilibrium it writes as T > T ￿ Tzz￿ and therefore
0 > ￿Tzz￿. As a consequence, the DNO chooses the tari⁄s intended for the low
22state. Peak-consumption given these tari⁄s, that is q￿, will never exceed the
network capacity: k￿ = ￿z￿ ￿ q￿. Therefore the capacity constraints satisfy.
In the high-production state, if the DNO chooses the contract intended for
the low state with Tz = 0, then the demand for z would increase to zmax. This
network load would exceed the network capacity: k￿ = ￿z￿ < ￿zmax. Since
non-price rationing is ruled out (by assumption), the ￿rm has to choose tari⁄s







Because an unregulated DNO can extract consumer surplus by a ￿xed fee, it will
charge the e¢ cient linear tari⁄s. As a consequence, it will invest in the optimal
network size. However, the pro￿ts are higher than in the social optimum due to
the ￿xed fees. The proof is as follows. The DNO solves the following problem:
max
tqL;tqH;tz;tL;tH;k
f￿(tqHqH + tzz + tH) + (1 ￿ ￿)(tqLqL + tL) ￿ Ck
+￿qH (k ￿ qH) + ￿qL (k ￿ qL) + ￿z (k ￿ ￿z)
+￿H (v(qH) + p(z) ￿ tqHqH ￿ tzz ￿ tH) + ￿L (v(qL) ￿ tqLqL ￿ tL)g
The two constraints included in the last row require that consumer surplus
should be positive in every state, since the pro￿t maximizing DNO must ensure
that households are willing to accept the contracts. Because the DNO can set




f￿(v(qH) + p(z)) + (1 ￿ ￿)v(qL) ￿ Ck
+￿qH (k ￿ qH) + ￿qL (k ￿ qL) + ￿z (k ￿ ￿z)g:
This optimization problem is then exactly the same as for the social optimum.
For similar reasons as for the social optimum, qH = qL : it is not reasonable for
the DNO to ration demand for q as long as it has already installed this capacity
and is able to receive positive marginal pro￿ts from selling these capacities to
households. With these simpli￿cations, we get exactly the same expressions as
(12). As a result, the ￿rm is willing to invest in the socially optimal network size
as long as the sum of its expected marginal revenues from both products (which
is also equal to the sum of households￿marginal bene￿ts in this case) exceeds
marginal costs. Similarly to the social optimum, three types of networks may
emerge according to the conditions described in Proposition 1. The unregulated
DNO charges marginal cost prices and extracts total consumer surplus by ￿xed
fees. In a general form, the tari⁄s and the expected social welfare write:
(tqL;0;tL) = (v0(q￿);0;v(q￿) ￿ v0(q￿)q￿)
(tqH;tzH;tH) = (v0(q￿);p0(z￿);v(q￿) + p(z￿) ￿ v0(q￿)q￿ ￿ p0(z￿)z￿)
EWUR = ￿(v(q￿) + ￿p(z￿) ￿ Ck￿);
where v0(q￿) +
￿
￿p0(z￿) = C and k￿ = max(q￿;￿z￿):
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